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The threat of a human influenza pandemic has greatly
increased over the past several years with the emergence
of highly virulent avian influenza viruses, notably H5N1
viruses, which have infected humans in several Asian and
European countries. Previous influenza pandemics have
arrived with little or no warning, but the current widespread
circulation of H5N1 viruses among avian populations and
their potential for increased transmission to humans and
other mammalian species may afford us an unprecedented
opportunity to prepare for the next pandemic threat. The
US Department of Health and Human Services is coordi-
nating a national strategy to respond to an influenza pan-
demic that involves multiple agencies, including the
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, the Food and
Drug Administration, and the National Institutes of Health
(NIH). Within NIH, the National Institute of Allergy and
Infectious Diseases (NIAID) conducts basic and clinical
research to develop new vaccine technologies and antiviral
drugs against influenza viruses. We describe recent
research progress in preparing for pandemic influenza. 
S
ince December 2003, H5N1 avian influenza viruses
have killed millions of domestic fowl in Southeast Asia
(tens of millions more have been culled). It has also infect-
ed >130 persons and killed >70 in Vietnam, Thailand,
Cambodia, Indonesia, and China (Figure 1) (1). If the virus
acquires the ability to transmit readily among humans, an
influenza pandemic could ensue, with the potential to kill
millions of people (2). Reports in both the popular press
(3) and scientific literature (4–7) have raised alarms in the
United States and throughout the world. The prospect of
pandemic influenza provides good reason to be concerned.
Rather than react in panic, however, we need to determine
what can be done now with the knowledge and resources
currently available to prevent or minimize the impact of a
potential pandemic. At the same time we must ask how we
can improve our infrastructure and technology to prepare
for future outbreaks.
Unlike seasonal influenza epidemics caused by viruses
that mutate in small but important ways from year to year,
a process known as antigenic drift, pandemic influenza is
caused by a virus that is dramatically different from those
that have circulated previously, which can occur through a
phenomenon referred to as antigenic shift (2). Such virus-
es can cause pandemics because few people, or none at all,
have had prior immunologic exposure to surface proteins
of these viruses. In a typical interpandemic influenza sea-
son, people may have some residual immunity from expo-
sure to previously circulating influenza strains or from
vaccinations (8). For example, the predominant circulating
influenza virus in the Northern Hemisphere during the
2004–2005 influenza season was an H3N2 virus that had
drifted somewhat but was still fundamentally similar to the
H3N2 viruses that had circulated in 2003–2004 and previ-
ously. Nonetheless, a virus that has undergone antigenic
drift can cause illness and death; vaccination provides
varying degrees of protection from severe illness and death
from influenza complications (8). Pandemic influenza,
however, can cause a public health crisis because most
people would be immunologically naive to the new virus.
In addition, the pandemic virus might be inherently more
virulent than interpandemic strains. Whereas seasonal
influenza rarely threatens the lives of young and otherwise
healthy persons, pandemic influenza frequently has exact-
ed a serious toll in healthy, young adults (2,9). 
As of December 2005, outbreaks of H5N1 avian
influenza viruses had occurred in domestic poultry popula-
tions in at least 16 countries in Asia and eastern Europe
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birds. Disease caused by H5N1 and presence of the virus
among thousands of migratory wildfowl have been
observed in western China, and more recently, in
Kazakhstan, Mongolia, and Croatia, which raises the pos-
sibility that H5N1 may be spreading from its stronghold in
Southeast Asia through migratory flyways (11–13). In
addition to a growing list of avian species, the virus has
infected several mammalian species, including tigers,
leopards, and pigs, and transmission among domestic cats
has been observed in the laboratory (14–16). Together,
these findings suggest that both the geographic and host
ranges of H5N1 viruses are expanding. 
The true extent of human H5N1 infections is not pre-
cisely known; preliminary reports suggest that the extent
of bird-to-human transmission may be more widespread
than originally thought (17). Thus far, the virus has not
acquired the ability to be efficiently transmitted from
human to human, although a recent report describes the
possible transmission of H5N1 within a family in Thailand
(18). 
The H5N1 avian influenza viruses now circulating may
be the most likely candidates for triggering an influenza
pandemic because of ongoing reports of new cases in
humans (19). However, other avian influenza viruses also
are being monitored for their potential to infect and cause
disease in humans (Figure 2). The H9N2 influenza virus,
although not highly pathogenic, has circulated widely
among birds in Hong Kong and China; it infected 2 chil-
dren in 1999 (20,21) and 1 child in Hong Kong in 2003
(22), each of whom recovered. Five additional human
infections with H9N2 viruses were reported in the Chinese
literature (23). Another avian influenza virus, H7N7, is
worrisome because it is highly pathogenic in birds and
appears to be more readily transmissible from human to
human (24,25). During a large outbreak of highly patho-
genic avian influenza in Europe in 2003, an H7N7 virus
was detected in at least 86 poultry workers and 3 family
members who had no contact with chickens; these persons
were treated for conjunctivitis, influenzalike symptoms, or
both. Aveterinarian who handled infected chickens died of
pneumonia and acute respiratory distress (24,25). With the
exception of this fatal case, the H7N7 virus appeared to be
relatively benign for humans. Recent reports indicate that
an H7 influenza A virus may be circulating among chick-
ens in North Korea (26). If a virus such as H5N1 (which is
highly pathogenic in humans) were to acquire the genetic
capability that enabled the efficient transmissibility
observed with H7N7 or human H1N1 or H3N2 influenza
viruses, while maintaining most or all of its pathogenic
potential, a deadly pandemic could ensue. 
Predicting or preventing the natural events that could
facilitate efficient transmission of a pandemic influenza
virus among humans is difficult. However, we must be pre-
pared to react quickly and decisively should such an event
occur. Critical to the containment of a potential influenza
pandemic is diligent surveillance for novel viruses in both
human and animal populations using appropriate diagnos-
tics; we must also monitor the viruses for changes that
could signal increased virulence or transmissibility.
Equally important are the development and production of
effective countermeasures, such as vaccines and antiviral
drugs (27).
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Figure 1. H5N1 cases in Asia, 2004–2005, among birds (dark
gray) and humans (black) (1). A total of 137 laboratory-confirmed
cases, including 70 deaths, occurred. This total includes 22 human
cases and 14 deaths in Thailand, 93 human cases and 42 deaths
in Vietnam, 4 human cases and 4 deaths in Cambodia, 13 human
cases and 8 deaths in Indonesia, and 5 human cases and 2
deaths in China.
Figure 2. Timeline of documented human infection with avian
influenza viruses, 1997–present (2). Sporadic cases of mild
human disease associated with avian influenza viruses were
reported before 1997.Pandemic Influenza Preparedness
Vaccine development is a critical component of pan-
demic influenza preparedness. In this regard, the National
Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases (NIAID) at the
National Institutes of Health (NIH) in April 2005 initiated
a phase I clinical trial to assess the safety and immuno-
genicity of different doses of an inactivated H5N1 influen-
za vaccine manufactured by Sanofi Pasteur (28). In this
study, 451 healthy adult volunteers were vaccinated at 3
sites in the United States. Preliminary evaluation indicates
the vaccine is safe and able to stimulate an immune
response that may be protective. The vaccine is currently
being tested in the elderly, and testing in children is expect-
ed to begin by January 2006. 
The H5N1 seed virus used to make this vaccine was
developed in a matter of weeks through the use of reverse
genetics, whereas the traditional process of genetic reas-
sortment usually requires a longer period of time and is
less predictable (29). Additional pilot lots of inactivated
vaccine are being produced by another manufacturer,
Chiron Corporation, and are expected to undergo testing
by early 2006.
Chiron also has produced 40,000 doses of an inactivat-
ed H9N2 influenza vaccine formulated with and without
MF59 adjuvant. Clinical trials to test the safety and
immunogenicity of the inactivated H9N2 vaccine are
underway, with promising preliminary results. In addition,
the US Department of Health and Human Services (HHS)
has awarded several contracts to pharmaceutical compa-
nies to produce large quantities of bulk H5N1 vaccine as
part of the HHS Pandemic Influenza Preparedness
Program. These contracts are a critical step toward pan-
demic influenza preparedness because they pave the way
for the manufacturer to commence efficient, large-scale
production of any pandemic vaccine if or when it is need-
ed. HHS has also awarded a separate contract to Sanofi
Pasteur to accelerate the development of cell culture–
based technologies for influenza vaccine production (28).
In addition, the intramural research program of NIAID
has generated live, attenuated, cold-adapted H9N2 and
H5N1 vaccine candidates that have proven protective in
mice. The H9N2 vaccine candidate has been tested in a
phase I clinical trial, and data are currently being evaluat-
ed; clinical evaluation of the H5N1 vaccine is planned for
the spring of 2006. Live, attenuated vaccines are especial-
ly promising because they generally trigger more rapid and
robust immune responses compared with those induced by
inactivated vaccines. Live, attenuated vaccines may also
offer more cross-reactivity and therefore greater protection
against different variants of the same virus (30). 
The concept of extending vaccine supplies also is being
pursued. Research has suggested that delivering vaccines
intradermally might allow successful immunization with
less antigen (31–33); clinical trials to compare intramuscu-
lar versus intradermal delivery of H5N1 vaccines began in
2005. Preliminary  safety data showed no adverse effects
and immunogenicity data are expected soon. Studies to
assess the effect of alum and MF59 adjuvants on inactivat-
ed H5N1 vaccine safety and immunogenicity also are
anticipated. 
Other research efforts are focused on medications to
treat influenza infection. Unfortunately, most currently cir-
culating H5N1 influenza viruses are resistant to 2 inexpen-
sive antiinfluenza drugs, rimantadine and amantadine, that
target the viral M2 protein. Newer drugs such as
oseltamivir phosphate and zanamivir that target the
influenza neuraminidase protein appear to be effective
against most current H5N1 strains (34). HHS and the
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention have begun
developing a stockpile of antiinfluenza drugs that includes
oseltamivir phosphate, zanamivir, and rimantadine for
future use should pandemic influenza occur. Numerous
other projects are under way to identify novel drug targets
and develop compounds that inhibit viral entry, replication,
and maturation (28). 
Underpinning these efforts are basic research studies.
For example, NIAID coordinates the Influenza Genome
Sequencing Project, a collaborative effort to create com-
plete genetic blueprints of known human and avian
influenza viruses. As of December 7, 2005, a total of 559
influenza genome sequences have been made publicly
available in GenBank by the NIAID project (35). In a sep-
arate but related contract awarded to researchers at St. Jude
Children’s Research Hospital, animal influenza viruses
from wild birds, live bird markets, and pigs in Hong Kong
and North America are being sequenced, and surveillance
has expanded to include additional sites in Asia. The goal
of these projects is to rapidly sequence influenza genomes
derived from a variety of human and animal sources to
enable scientists to understand how the viruses evolve,
spread, and cause disease. The long-term goal is improv-
ing methods of prevention and treatment.
The Fragile Vaccine Enterprise
As we develop strategies to prepare for an influenza
pandemic, we need to address the overall fragility of the
entire vaccine research and manufacturing enterprise
(27,36,37). Many pharmaceutical companies are reluctant
to enter or remain in the business of manufacturing vac-
cines. Unpredictable consumer demands and lack of finan-
cial incentives make vaccine manufacturing a risky
business in today’s marketplace. This situation is particu-
larly true with influenza vaccine. Strong collaborations
among government, academia, and industry are needed to
ensure a reliable vaccine supply. The biomedical research
community can help by developing state-of-the-art
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the manufacturing process and make it more flexible, pre-
dictable, and able to adapt to the evolving nature of
influenza viruses and other pathogens. Financial and eco-
nomic incentives, including fair pricing and guaranteed
purchase of unsold supplies, regulatory relief, tax incen-
tives, liability protection, and intellectual property consid-
erations, are needed to ensure a steady supply of vaccines
(27,36,37). Although the fragility of the vaccine industry
cannot be fixed overnight, the process needs to be initiated
now to adequately prepare for future pandemics. 
Lessons from Severe Acute 
Respiratory Syndrome
Recent experience with an outbreak of severe acute res-
piratory syndrome (SARS) serves as an instructive example
in preparing for a potential influenza pandemic (38,39). In
2002, the deadly respiratory disease emerged and rapidly
spread to Canada, Vietnam, Hong Kong, and other sites in
China, ultimately resulting in 8,098 cases and 774 deaths.
The outbreak, which elicited a classic study in epidemio-
logic investigation with regard to identifying the point
source, tracking the spread, and instituting containment
measures, taught us many important lessons. Academic sci-
entists, public health officials, and commercial pharmaceu-
tical companies acted together in an unprecedented way,
leading to the development of promising vaccine candi-
dates in record time. The etiologic agent of SARS, a previ-
ously unrecognized coronavirus, was identified in March
2003 and sequenced within 2 weeks, and a vaccine candi-
date was developed by the following March. In December
2004, a clinical trial of a candidate SARS vaccine began at
the NIH Vaccine Research Center (40). 
Because the SARS coronavirus is not as easily transmit-
ted as influenza viruses, we do not know whether the
actions that led to the containment of SARS would be as
successful if an avian influenza virus acquired the ability to
spread efficiently from person to person. However, we have
an added advantage in bracing for pandemic influenza that
we did not have with SARS. As noted, SARS is caused by
a coronavirus that was unknown before the 2003 outbreak.
In the current situation, we have identified the H5N1 virus
as a likely candidate for triggering a pandemic. 
We cannot be certain when the next influenza pandem-
ic will emerge, or even whether it will be caused by H5N1
or an unrelated virus. However, we can be certain that an
influenza pandemic eventually will occur. The efforts cur-
rently under way to monitor the evolution and spread of
H5N1 and other influenza viruses and to develop candidate
vaccines and appropriate countermeasures will help in
developing the infrastructure and manufacturing capacity
that will be required to scale up vaccine and antiviral pro-
duction when the pandemic occurs. 
Because quantities of vaccine and antiviral drugs against
a pandemic influenza virus will be limited, deciding before-
hand how to best use our resources throughout the world to
minimize the impact of pandemic influenza is critical.
Global cooperation will be vital. During the SARS epidem-
ic, the World Health Organization created an outstanding
network of laboratories and public health agencies from
countries around the globe that were indispensable in iden-
tifying and ultimately containing the spread of the virus. To
adequately address the many research issues surrounding
avian influenza and other potential pandemic pathogens,
NIAID’s Office of Clinical Research is establishing a
Southeast Asia Clinical Trials Network to evaluate influen-
za interventions. This network builds upon existing infra-
structure where possible and will be a true partnership
between the investigators and the healthcare leadership of
the target countries. Such international teamwork is essen-
tial as we prepare for an influenza pandemic.
Acknowledgments
The author thanks Nancy Touchette, Hillery Harvey, and
Gregory Folkers for helpful discussions and review of the manu-
script. 
Dr Fauci is director of NIAID of the National Institutes of
Health in Bethesda, Maryland. He oversees a portfolio of basic
and applied research to prevent, diagnose, and treat infectious
diseases, including influenza. 
References
1. World Health Organization. Confirmed human cases of avian influen-
za A(H5N1). 2005 [cited 2005 Oct 31]. Available from
http://www.who.int/csr/disease/avian_influenza/country/en/ 
2. World Health Organization. Avian influenza: assessing the pandemic
threat. 2005 [cited 2005 Oct 31]. Available from http://www.who.
int/csr/disease/influenza/WHO_CDS_2005_29/en/
3. Specter M. Nature’s bioterrorist. New Yorker. 2005 Feb 28. p. 50–61.
4.  Webby RJ, Webster RG. Are we ready for pandemic influenza?
Science. 2003;302:1519–22.
5. Monto AS. The threat of and an avian influenza pandemic. N Engl J
Med. 2005;352:323–5.
6. Stohr K. Avian influenza and pandemics: research needs and oppor-
tunities. N Engl J Med. 2005;352:405–7.
7.  Institute of Medicine. The threat of pandemic influenza: are we
ready? 2004 Nov [cited 2005 Oct 21]. Available from http://www.
iom.edu/report.asp?id=23639
8. Couch RB. An overview of serum antibody responses to influenza
virus antigens. Dev Biol (Basel). 2003;115:25–30.
9. Reid AH, Taubenberger JK, Fanning TG. The 1918 Spanish influen-
za: integrating history and biology. Microbes Infect. 2003;3:81–7.
10. World Organization for Animal Health. Update on avian influenza in
animals (type 5). 2005 Oct 28 [cited 2005 Oct 31]. Available from
http://www.oie.int/downld/AVIAN%20INFLUENZA/A_AI-
Asia.htm
11. Food and Agriculture Organization. AIDE News: AI Bulletin. Update
on the avian influenza situation (as of 1/9/2005). Issue no. 33. [cited
2005 Oct 31]. Available from http://www.fao.org/ag/againfo/sub-
jects/documents/ai/AVIbull033.pdf
INFLUENZA PREVENTION
76 Emerging Infectious Diseases • www.cdc.gov/eid • Vol. 12, No. 1, January 200612. Chen H, Smith GJ, Zhang SY, Qin K, Wang J, Li KS, et al. Avian flu:
H5N1 virus outbreak in migratory water fowl. Nature.
2005;436:191–2.
13. Liu J, Xiao H, Lei F, Zhu Q, Qin K, Zhang X, et al. Highly pathogen-
ic H5N1 influenza virus infection in migratory birds. Science.
2005;309:1206.
14. Kuiken T, Rimmelzwaan G, van Riel D, van Amerongen G, Baars M,
Fouchier R, et al. Avian influenza in cats. Science. 2004;306:241.
15. Keawcharoen J, Oraveerakul K, Kuiken T, Fouchier RA, Amonsin A,
Payungporn S, et al. Avian influenza in tigers and leopards. Emerg
Infect Dis. 2004;10:2189–91.
16. World Health Organization. Avian influenza: H5N1 detected in pigs
in China. WHO Communicable Disease Surveillance and Response.
2004 Aug 20 [cited 2005 Oct 21]. Available from
http://www.who.int/csr/don/2004_08_20/en/
17. Olsen SJ, Ungchusak K, Sovann L, Uyeki TM, Dowell SF, Cox NJ,
et al. Family clustering of avian influenza A (H5N1). Emerg Infec
Dis. 2005;11:1799–1801.
18. Ungchusak K, Auewarakul P, Dowell SF, Kitphati R, Auwanit W,
Puthhavathana P, et al. Probable person-to-person transmission of
avian influenza A (H5N1). N Engl J Med. 2005;352:333–40.
19. World Health Organization. Avian influenza: situation updates. 2005
[cited 2005 Oct 21]. Available from http://www.who.int/csr/disease/
avian_influenza/updates/en/
20. Peiris M, Yuen KY, Leung CW, Chan KH, Ip PL, Lai RW, et al.
Human infection with influenza H9N2. Lancet. 1999;354:916–7.
21. Choi YK, Ozaki H, Webby RJ, Webster RG, Peiris JS, Poon L, et al.
Continuing evolution of H9N2 influenza viruses in southeastern
China. J Virol. 2004;78:8609–14.
22. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. Avian influenza infec-
tion in humans. 2005 Oct 17 [cited 2005 Oct 21]. Available from
http://www.cdc.gov/flu/avian/gen-info/avian-flu-humans.htm
23. Guo Y, Li J, Cheng X. Discovery of men infected by avian influenza
A H9N2 virus. Zhonghua Shi Yan He Lin Chuang Bing Du Xue Za
Zhi. 1999;13:105–8.
24. Fouchier RA, Schneeburger PM, Rozendaal FW, Broekman JM,
Kemink SA, Munster V, et al. Avian influenza A virus (H7N7) asso-
ciated with human conjunctivitis and a fatal case of acute respiratory
distress syndrome. Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A. 2004;101:1356–61.
25. Koopmans M, Wilbrink B, Conyn M, Natrop G, van der Nat H,
Vennema H, et al. Transmission of H7N7 avian influenza A virus to
human beings during a large outbreak in commercial poultry farms in
the Netherlands. Lancet. 2004;363:587–93.
26. Food and Agriculture Organization. AIDE News: AI Bulletin. Update
on the avian influenza situation (as of 12/05/2005). Issue no. 30.
[cited 2005 Oct 21]. Available from  http://www.fao.org/ag/againfo/
subjects/documents/ai/AVIbull030.pdf
27. Fauci AS. Race against time. Nature. 2005;435:423–4.
28. National Institutes for Allergy and Infectious Diseases. Focus on the
flu. 2005 Jun 21 [cited 2005 Oct 21]. Available from
http://www2.niaid.nih.gov/Newsroom/FocusOn/Flu04/#resources
29. Webby RJ, Perez DR, Coleman JS, Guan Y, Knight JH, Govorkova
EA, et al. Responsiveness to a pandemic alert: use of reverse genet-
ics for rapid development of influenza vaccines. Lancet.
2004;363:1099–103.
30. Clements ML, Betts RF, Murphy BR. Advantage of live attenuated
cold-adapted influenza A virus over inactivated vaccine for
A/Washington/80 (H3N2) wild-type virus infection. Lancet.
1984;1:705–8.
31. La Montagne JR, Fauci AS. Intradermal influenza vaccination: can
less be more? N Engl J Med. 2004;351:2330–2.
32. Belshe RB, Newman FK, Cannon J, Duane C, Treanor J, van Hoecke
C, et al. Serum antibody responses after intradermal vaccination
against influenza. N Engl J Med. 2004;351:2286–94.
33. Kenney RT, Frech SA, Muenz LR, Villar CP, Glenn GM. Dose spar-
ing with intradermal injection of influenza vaccine. N Engl J Med.
2004;351:2295–301.
34.  Ward P, Small I, Smith J, Suter P, Dutkowski R. Oseltamivir
(Tamiflu) and its potential for use in the event of an influenza pan-
demic. J Antimicrob Chemother. 2005;55(Suppl 1):i5–21.
35.  National Center for Biotechnology Information. Influenza virus
resource. 2005 Jun 23 [cited 2005 Oct 31]. Available from
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/genomes/FLU/FLU.html
36. Sloan FA, Berman S, Rosenbaum S, Chalk RA, Giffin RB. The
fragility of the U.S. vaccine supply. N Engl J Med. 2004;351:2443–7.
37. Poland GA, Marcuse EK. Vaccine availability in the US: problems
and solutions. Nat Immunol. 2004;5:1195–8.
38. Muller MP, McGeer A, Straus SE, Hawryluck L, Gold WL. Clinical
trials and novel pathogens: lessons learned from SARS. Emerg Infect
Dis. 2004;10:389–94.
39. Finlay BB, See RH, Brunham RC. Rapid response research to emerg-
ing infectious diseases. Nat Rev Microbiol. 2004;2:602–7.
40. National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases. First US SARS
vaccine trial opens at NIH. 2004 Dec 13 [cited 2005 Oct 21].
Available from http://www2.niaid.nih.gov/newsroom/releases/sars-
trial.htm
Address for correspondence: Anthony S. Fauci, National Institute of
Allergy and Infectious Diseases, National Institutes of Health, Bldg 31,
Room 7A03, MSC 2520, Bethesda, MD 20892-2520, USA; fax: 301-
496-4409; email: afauci@niaid.nih.gov
Pandemic Influenza Threat and Preparedness
Emerging Infectious Diseases • www.cdc.gov/eid • Vol. 12, No. 1, January 2006 77
Valued Emerging Infectious Diseases reader:  
In a continuing effort to ensure that you receive the best quality publication, you are 
invited to take part in an EID Subscriber Satisfaction Survey. Your input will greatly help improve
current content, identify potential new topic areas, and deliver new features.
The online survey is available at http://websurveyor.net/wsb.dll/23779/EID.htm and should take
about 20 minutes to complete. Participation is completely voluntary.